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The Russian Cinematic Culture 
Oksana Bulgakova 
 
The cinema has always been subject to keen scrutiny by Russia's rulers. 
As early as the beginning of this century Russia's last czar, Nikolai 
Romanov, attempted to nationalize this new and, in his view, threatening 
medium: "I have always insisted that these cinema-booths are dangerous 
institutions. Any number of bandits could commit God knows what crimes 
there, yet they say the people go in droves to watch all kinds of rubbish; I 
don't know what to do about these places." [1] The plan for a government 
monopoly over cinema, which would ensure control of production and 
consumption and thereby protect the Russian people from moral ruin, was 
passed along to the Duma not long before the February revolution of 
1917. [2] However, it was ultimately carried out in 1919 by the same 
Bolsheviks who had executed Romanov, and Vladimir Lenin formulated 
one of the Communist Party's political postulates in regard to cinema by 
announcing it to be, in 1922, "the most important of all the arts." [3] Yet 
it was truly made the most important medium of the new society by 
Joseph Stalin, who expressed this almost metaphysical conviction in 1924: 
"Film is an illusion, but it dictates its laws to life." [4] 
When cinema first came onto the scene at the turn of the century as a 
means to capture movement visually, and then rapidly grew into an 
industry producing story-telling pictures, it became one of the first global 
vehicles for expression, erasing national boundaries between cultures. The 
first musings about this new technological phenomenon captured the shift 
in cultural paradigms which defined the turn of the century: the eternal; 
the fleeting moment; originality, abundance, genius; anonymous 
collectivity and organic unity; chaos and composition; fragments and 
organisms; mechanism and morality; amorality and depth; the 
concentration of all feeling at the surface and the primary visual sense; 
body and soul, etc. For this reason cinema, with its dense clotting of new 
qualities (the visual, the immediate, the mechanical, etc.) was often 
viewed as the quintissential vehicle for modernity. 
Russian film, however, reflected values which had been defined by a pre-
industrial society; this was evident in the peculiarly archaic tendency of 
this medium. This duality, which bespoke an ambivalence toward the 
assimilation of modernity, shaped the specifics of Russian film for many 
years. Russia managed to create an ideological and artistic construct 
which was in direct and conscious opposition to the development of the 
moving pictures industry throughout the rest of the world, particularly in 
Hollywood . The stylistic similarities between Russian films and those 
made in Europe or America -- be they the melodramas of the 'teens, with 
their moody interiors; the virtual cinematic reality constructed in the film-
studios of the 1930s; or the "raw physical reality" so fashionable in the 
1960s -- do not outweigh the profoundly different understanding and 
function of film in Russia, which was tied inextricably to cultural tradition, 
the promulgation of national stereotypes, and the means by which they 
were implemented. I can do no more than sketch a few points of 
demarcation within the development of this singular phenomenon which 
we loosely term "Russian cinema," moving chronologically from the turn of 
the century to our own time. 
I will explore four cinematic crossroads in the evolution of Russian 
cinematic culture: the connotation of cinema as a place of the death and 
rebirth of the collective soul at the beginning of the century; the 
palimpsest of old forms and radicalized means of expression in Russian 
montage cinema, which was perceived abroad as a reflection of the 
ruptured Russian soul in the 1920s; the cultivation of non-commercial yet 
mass-scale cinema, oriented toward government-sanctioned collective 
reverie from the 1930s through the '50s; and finally, modern-day 
attempts to individualize cinematic expression. 
The Turn of the Century: Celebration and Death 
On May 9th, 1896, Nikolai Romanov arrived in Moscow , the ancient 
capital, for his coronation in the Kremlin's Uspenskii Sobor (Chapel of the 
Assumption). The ceremony was to have been followed by a mass 
celebration at Khodynskii Field on May 18 and the distribution of royal 
gifts. But the crowd of several thousand rushed to the site of the 
festivities so precipitously that almost two thousand people were trampled 
to death in the mad panic. Moscow 's governor-general had to put in his 
appearance at the Vagankovskoe cemetery, where the bodies had been 
carted, instead of the ball at the French embassy. Much of the Russian 
intelligentsia interpreted this event as a symbolic overture to the new era, 
as an omen of Russia 's fate. "Our people are not accustomed to 
festivities. They tried it at Khodynskoe, bit off their own tail, and once 
more the terrible mysterious monster crawled off into its gloomy den," 
remarked the writer Garin-Mikhailovsky, [5] using this new event to 
buttress an age-old trope: Russians are fit for nothing but tragedy. The 
first films shot in Russia , by Pathé Félix Mesguich, centered around these 
very events. [6] 
This Western technological invention, cinema, played a specific national 
role in Russia , and one of its qualities became the lack of a "happy 
ending." Almost all Russian films, even the most trivial, end in tragedy. 
These inevitable unhappy endings are taken into account by audiences 
and producers, both in Russia and abroad. Foreign producers often shot 
two endings--a happy one for their own market, and an unhappy one for 
Russian viewers who, unlike others throughout the world, only flocked to 
tragic tales. Similarly, Russian producers would film a grim ending for the 
home audience and a cheerful alternative for the outside world. Even the 
parallel montage, with the inevitable last-minute salvation of its subject, 
was altered. Yuri Tsivian, a historian of early Russian cinema, notes that 
the Russian replica of D.W. Griffith's film "The Lonely Villa" (1909), called 
"A Drama by the Telephone" and directed by Iakov Protazanov in 1914, 
ends thus: The husband, after being warned over the telephone that 
robbers are about to break into his house, rushes home after a mad car 
chase only to come upon his wife's corpse. [7] These tragic endings -- in 
death, suicide, insanity--upheld the foreign conviction of "terrific Slavic 
emotions" and traced their roots to the Russian theatrical melodrama of 
the nineteenth century. [8] This practice of double endings continued 
through the beginning of the 1930s, when the Soviet directors Grigorii 
Kozintsev and Leonid Trauberg were asked to film a separate European 
ending to their heart-rending melodrama "S.V.D." In the Russian version 
the hero dies before the eyes of a beautiful woman. The studio heads 
suggested that the directors film the following alternative "bearing in mind 
the demands of the foreign market: 'The general's wife finds him 
unconscious (not dead) on the riverbank. Next scene: A park (with a villa 
nearby, a lake in the distance, or better yet the sea), where we find the 
hero sitting on a bench with a bandage around his head, indicating a 
wound. Nearby, also in the park, the wife bustles around a lavishly set 
table, caring for the convalescent. The words "The End" scroll down.'" [9] 
The link between cinema and death became commonplace to Russian 
audiences. Unlike many of the first Western filmgoers, who noted the 
lifelike rustling of tree-leaves and recalled "the realistic effects" and 
"animated nature," [10] the Russian visitor to the first film screening at 
the Nizhnegorodskaia Trade Fair, watching that very same chronicle by 
Pathé, might have agreed more with Maksim Gorky, who described the 
spectacle as a necropolis, a kingdom of shadows, lifeless and frightening 
space: "There are no sounds, no colors. There, everything--the earth, the 
trees, the people, the water, the air--is tinted in a grey monotone.. This is 
not life but the shadow of life; this is not movement but the soundless 
shadow of movement. . . . Curses and ghosts, evil spirits that have cast 
whole cities into eternal sleep come to mind. . . . " [11] 
Even more so than portraiture or photography, film was perceived as life's 
dangerous phantom double, with various mystical powers. This link is a 
frequent theme in the plots of many early Russian films; it became central 
to many films by the most significant director of the period, Evgenii 
Bauer: "After Death" (1915), based on Ivan Turgenev's short story "Klara 
Milich; "Daydreams" (1915) based on Georges Rodenbach's "Bruges la 
Morte"; or "The Dying Swan" (1916), based on Stanislaw 
Prszybyszewsky's novel Homo Sapiens. "The Dying Swan" is especially 
noteworthy as a singular explanation of the nature of cinema. 
The plot follows two storylines: The hero leaves a mute dancer for a 
singer. The mute dancer begins to model for a decadent artist, who seeks 
to capture absolute beauty in the seemingly impossible synthesis of 
dynamics and absolute tranquility -- that is, in stopped motion -- so he 
kills his model during their session. The themes linking these stories -- 
muteness, motion, beauty, and death -- become a symbolic interpretation 
of the nature of film itself. The heroine's muteness emphasizes her intense 
expressiveness, which definitively paraphrases cinema's unspoken goal, to 
take away speech and reveal the soul in gesture alone, without verbal 
mediation. Life's intrinsic banality is tied to voice and speech--hence the 
sordid little affair between the hero and the singer. The second cinematic 
paradigm lies in the juxtaposition of motion and stillness, beauty and 
time. In 1914 Bauer made a film based on the symbolist Valerii Briusov's 
poem "Life in Death," which touched upon a similar theme. The story 
revolves around a doctor who kills and embalms his wife in order to 
preserve her beauty forever. With this plot, Bauer seemed to anticipate 
André Bazen's essay on "The Ontology of the Photographic Image," which 
tied the birth of cinema and other plastic arts with the practice of 
embalming, finding therein the bases for a "mummy complex." Death, the 
ultimate victory over time, opposed the desire to fix artificially the visible, 
physical object, tearing it out of the flow of time and thus attaching it to 
life, which "flows" from subject to reproduction, finally liberated from 
convulsive stillness by cinematic imagery.[12] It is no accident that dance 
was such a beloved theme of early filmmakers.[13] Yet 
cinematic motion is an illusion; film consists of a series 
of motionless photographic stills, which freeze the minutiae of movement. 
This death of motion signifies that absolute calm which the decadent artist 
seeks in vain in the old expressive arts, identifying frozen motion with 
absolute beauty. Death and film share the ability to freeze motion and 
time. These parallels, so crucial to Russians' initial response to cinema, 
were also reflected in fashionable literary themes at the turn of the 
century -- the novellas of Edgar Allan Poe or Villiers de l'Isle 
Adam's Contes Cruels. 
Yet in its aesthetic Russian cinema fiercely rejects modernism, relying 
instead on a peculiar brand of creative anachronism: Russian artistic 
achievements of the late nineteenth century (Turgenev's and Tolstoy's 
novels, the Peredvizhniks' naturalist school of painting, the psychology of 
daily life explored by the Malyi Theatre and refined in Konstantin 
Stanislavsky's Theatre Academy) are co-opted by film and presented as 
the pinnacles of twentieth century art. Specifically, this resulted in slow-
moving narrative; the conscious rejection of montage (Russian actors 
perfected a singular method of explicitly showing the passage from one 
state to another, while montage strives toward elliptical abbreviation); 
and sets cluttered with various everyday objects and furniture, which 
rendered the overall composition more theatrical than cinematographic. 
These peculiarities contradicted the essential poetics of the new medium--
dynamism, simultaneous action, ruptured connections, random action, the 
primacy of fragments over the whole. The Russian avant-garde managed 
to derail the dominant tendencies of Russian filmmaking only for a short 
period in the 1920s; they returned, in slightly altered form, to the cinema 
of the '30s. 
As a new sociological phenomenon, however, film attracted the attention 
of a wide spectrum of intellectuals--everyone from social-democrats 
toNarodniks to the symbolists. All of them were fascinated by the 
audience, the public response to film, since this was, after all, the first 
truly democratic form of enterntainment. Russian cities had no previous 
entertainment industry which catered to the lower classes, unlike 
European and American cities. There was no street theatre, no music 
halls, and even the variety-theatres were more like artistic clubs, closed to 
the masses. Yet in 1912, the writer Alexander Serafimovich remarks with 
surprise: "Look out into the rows of a movie-house audience. You will be 
amazed at the composition of the public:everyone is here -- students and 
militia-guards, writers and prostitutes, officers and girl-students, all kinds 
of intellectuals in glasses, with beards, and workers and clerks and society 
ladies and hairdressers and bureaucrats--just about everybody!"[14] The 
populist democrats viewed the movie-house as an ideal opportunity to 
enlighten the masses. Russian symbolists hoped that by uniting all layers 
of society under one roof and subjecting them to the same emotional 
experience they might realize their dream of "collective action," in the 
spirit of Viacheslav Ivanov's theories. Liberal utopianists saw the gathering 
of different social strata as a guarantee of social harmony; shared 
emotional experience makes class distinctions obsolete.[15] The cinema 
was seen as a place of social consolidation. Similar utopias, as well as the 
romanticization of the movie-going public, are rare in the 
Western/European world. The cinema is a freakshow where the monster 
on display is the public itself, where the asthmatic children of syphilitics 
collapse in fits of coughing and drunken proletarians mutter to themselves 
-- or so a doctor from the Berlin University clinic, Alfred Doblin, describes 
this convergence of social strata.[16] The chief concerns of the Western 
intelligentsia--the collapse of a unified worldview, the scattering of 
perception which leads to the fragmentation of personality, aesthetics 
giving way to the immediate, the superficial, expression on a mass scale--
were only on the periphery of Russia's cultural perception with regard to 
the cinema. The movie-house was seen as a place of collective unity, the 
salvation of a society rattled to its foundations by the reforms of the 
beginning of the century. 
The cinema connoted the death of life and the resurrection of the 
collective spirit. 
The 1920s. Montage and the Split of the Soul 
In 1917 the world of Russian cinema collapsed along with the rest of the 
Russian world. Three of the more successful pre-revolutionary filmmakers-
-Alexander Khanzhonkov, Iosef Ermoliev, and Dmitri Kharitonov--
managed to emigrate to Western Europe by way of the Crimea and 
Odessa, taking with them not only most of the available studio equipment, 
film reserves, archives of film negatives, etc., but also their creative and 
technical personnel: directors, cameramen, set artists, costume designers, 
administrators, and popular actors. In 1917, 337 films were made in 
Russia ; in 1918, there were only six. Most of the films made during the 
first seven years of Soviet rule have not survived due to the lack of film on 
which to make copies; a few were printed several years after they were 
first made, as was the case with "Polikushka," which was filmed in 1919 
yet did not make it to the screen until 1922. Since the economic blockade 
limited opportunities to import film (which was not produced in Russia) 
from abroad, Soviet filmmakers developed a complicated method of 
"rinsing off" old films and treating the celluloid with new emulsion. There 
is no way to know how effective this particular method was, but Soviet 
cinema immediately established itself as a palimpsest of pre-revolutionary 
film on many other levels. The first Soviet films imitated the forms of 
older Russian cinema in almost every way, from plot devices (for example, 
the lovers' triangle ending in death) and set design to actors and 
montage. In 1922 Alexander Panteleev (who had made the first Soviet 
propaganda film, "The Miracle-Worker," in 1919 and been praised by 
Lenin), shot a tried-and-true Russian melodrama entitled "There is No 
Happiness on Earth." The husband has no money, but does have 
tuberculosis, and his pretty young wife is easily seduced by his rich friend. 
After the radical reforms in family law passed in 1918 divorce no longer 
posed any legal problems, but still could not be the subject of a film. 
Thus, the husband commits suicide and the wife goes insane. The 
profound and deeply rooted pessimism of traditional Russian film was not 
shaken by the revolution. Panteleev even saved the interior design of the 
old sets (a yacht or a boudoir with bronzed mirrors and champagne for 
the traditional seduction scene, a bourgeois parlor for the family scenes). 
Only a few inconsequential details refer to the new reality: Instead of a 
bank, the husband works at the Smolnii (Bolshevik headquarters); the 
seducer is an emigré who returns to Petrograd with an American passport 
and dollars. Even more incredible is the retention of Russian film's 
traditional allegorical forms--a fatalistic historical philosophy far from Karl 
Marx's class doctrine. Gardin's historical allegory of the revolution, with its 
title--"A Ghost Wanders Through Europe" (1923) -- inspired by 
Marx'sCommunist Manifesto, is actually a retelling of Edgar Allan Poe's 
gothic horror story "The Masque of the Red Death." The turbulence of the 
revolution is ascribed to mystical forces, as the results of plague, as an 
outraged father's personal vengeance for his daughter's seduction and 
ruin, etc. Moreover, Gardin employs the same nature motifs, props, and 
costumes as Bauer had used in his 1916 film "The King of Paris"! Cheslav 
Sabinsky's 1924 agitational film "The Venerable Vasilii the Filthy" mocks 
the traditional saga of a saint's life with antireligious subtitles. But without 
these subtitles the film could easily be perceived as a morality tale about 
a repentant sinner, especially since it imitates the psychological 
naturalism of the film "Father Sergii" (directed by Iakov Protazanov in 
1916). 
Seven years after the revolution Soviet publicists began to catch on that 
there was no new Soviet cinema, and demanded that the Bolshevik party 
undertake decisive measures regarding the politics of financing filmmaking 
and taxation of movie theatres.[17] Various members of the avant-garde 
also demanded radical reforms. In August of 1922 the constructivist 
Aleksei Gan published the first issue of his magazine "Kino-Phot," which 
became a platform for Russia 's first "modernist" filmmakers Dziga Vertov 
and Lev Kuleshov.[18] Vertov developed his models of "dynamic 
geometry" and the "kino-eye," which were based on a total rejection of 
the mimetic, psychological, or eccentric "theatre-as-film," which 
emphasized the immanent freedom of the camera, which has the ability to 
see what the human eye cannot. The director is equally free from the 
constraints of logic, and creates his own particular connections between 
the segments of this new vision (telescopic, microscopic, 
cinematographic...), liberally manipulating speed, time, space, and 
causality. The rules of montage, as well as the rules of film imagery, were 
based on a medial grammar, similar to the "unintelligible language" of 
futurist poetry (in which Vertov had dabbled before becoming a 
filmmaker). However, in seeking an absolute cinematic language, Vertov 
was placed by chance at the head of the political chronology of film,[19] 
which led to certain conflicts between "abstract filmmaking" and concrete 
social demands. Vertov was criticized on both the left and the right as a 
"false documentarian," and the interpretation of "cinematic truth" 
remained eternally ambiguous (frequently overlooked was the fact 
that cinematic truth was by its very nature a step removed from reality). 
"All of his (Vertov's) work was aimed at studying the rhythmic nature of 
montage... For his experiments with various rhythmic variations created 
from pieces of film, he needed the sort of material that he could cut up 
with scissors however he wanted. 'Life as it is' was the perfect material -- 
random bits in which nothing is 'constructed,' filmed by different people in 
different places. For the most part these were cuts of filmed, evenly 
paced, repetitive processes: people working, machines working, the 
movement of crowds, etc. ," remarked Vsevolod Pudovkin, one of Vertov's 
few colleagues who thought that it was "utterly ridiculous to consider 
(him) a 'documentarian.'"[20] 
Lev Kuleshov's career was no less paradoxical. He started out as an artist 
working on films with Evgenii Bauer, to whom he dedicated his book about 
cinema entitled The Banner of Cinematography, which explored the 
medium's two main constructive elements: light and space.[21] Kuleshov 
almost parodies the expressive beauty of Bauer's films in his"bare" shots -
- the objects and set decorations are all markedly geometric in shape, 
contours and textures are permeated with light, the background is 
neutral, the props are carefully chosen and their number deliberately 
limited. The natural environment in Russia, its "motley peacock slush," is 
not photogenic enough for film, according to the director.[22] According to 
Kuleshov, only specific architectural structures possess this photogenic 
quality (for example, railroad bridges and skyscrapers, due to their 
immediately perceivable geometric form). Dynamic--and hence 
cinematographic -- objects include cars, locomotives, airplanes, 
motorcycles, and specially synchronized actors, trained in a specific 
method which Kuleshov termed "naturism," who had complete control 
over their bodies and could create cinematic motion which had nothing to 
do with chaotic day-to-day movement. 
Kuleshov believed that cinema must be maximally dynamic, a concern for 
American filmmakers as well. For this reason Kuleshov termed his method 
of cinematic expression "Americanism," which meant specifically the 
presentation of movement in an elliptical, abbreviated way. His films 
revolved around themes such as rapid motion and the protagonist's ability 
to control this speed, whether it be a machine, technology, or his own 
body as the ultimate machine. The average length of one shot in Bauer's 
film "Mute Witnesses" (1914) was, according to Yuri Tsivian's count, about 
one minute--six times slower than in American motion pictures. The 
average length of a shot in Kuleshov's first film, "Engineer Pright's Project" 
(1918) was six seconds, which was one and a half times faster. 
The flat, rectangular screen put constructive restraints on Kuleshov, 
helping to reduce the amount of visual information (for instance, rotating 
the geometric shapes of the objects being filmed, motion which runs 
parallel or diagonally to the frame of the shot, and movement which 
avoids curved lines) and making it more comprehensible. The burden of 
semantics lies in the junction of the shots. Montage either shortens or 
draws out time, creating spaces which cannot exist in reality. In his 
experiments with montage, Kuleshov proved that the viewer automatically 
establishes space-time and cause-and-effect relationships between 
disparate fragments. 
Russian art is radical in its emotion -- it takes everything right up to the 
end.” This is how the most influential Berlin critic, Alfred Kerr, attempted 
to describe this new Russian cinematic phenomenon in the introduction to 
his book The Russian Cinema.[23] The book’s opening photograph, 
however, depicts a Chechnyan soldier with a knife between his teeth. It is 
no accident that montage is acknowledged to be the fundamental 
distinguishing characteristic of Russian film. Russian directors avidly 
experimented with montage, as did the French and German avant-garde. 
Yet this technique, which frequently involves the contraposition and 
splicing of two completely unrelated images, bespeaks the specific 
mentality of Russian national cinema (perhaps as a manifestation of the 
violent internal split in the Slavic-Tatar soul). In “Potemkin” Kerr sees an 
“apocalyptic vision of the future,” and credits the film’s success to its vivid 
realism, the ethnographic models employed, and also to Stanislavsky (“He 
laid the foundation for Russian film”) and Dostoyevsky (“the same 
abysmal passions”).[24] The German critics juxtapose Eisenstein’s 
naturalism, models, montage, and mass-scale scenes with the historical 
pictures made in Hollywood , which seem like idyllic pastorals in 
comparison. However, the critic Oscar A. H. Schmitz approaches 
“Potemkin” in terms of the nineteenth-century novel and thus finds none 
of the qualities of ‘true art’ in the film (which lacks a distinct protagonist 
who thinks and suffers, an individual consciousness). Walter Beniamin 
challenges this view, declaring that “Potemkin” charts the coordinates of 
the new twentieth-century art: violence and the masses, collective destiny 
and technology.[25] 
Western European critics tended to see Russian films as the expression of 
one author, one genius, though this contradicted the new artist’s creed in 
Soviet Russia: He presents his professional skill to the working classes, 
articulating its interests and desires; he is their medium, answering 
society’s demands. These passionate, violent, sentimental, eccentric, 
propagandistic, and experimental new Russian films found their admirers 
among millionaires and Dadaists, psychoanalysts and professional 
revolutionaries. They included Antonin Artaud, Charlie Chaplin, Douglas 
Fairbanks, and Le Corbusier. At the same time, those very films which 
gained the greatest critical reputation abroad as models of the new 
Russian art flopped at home. Russian audiences preferred either Western 
or Soviet popular films, with American, German, or Russian stars such as 
Douglas Fairbanks, Harry Piel, Conrad Veidt, or Vera Malinovskaya. 
According to a Kino-Gazette survey, the most popular Soviet director of 
the 1920s was not Eisenstein, but Abram Roam, who had made a comedy 
about a three-way marriage called “The Third Bourgeois” (1927). “Our 
cinema here has a pre-war atmosphere. I’m talking about the big picture, 
so to speak. Right now the story of the prodigal son is a popular theme: a 
man strays away from the straight and narrow, but finally returns to his 
own. Along the way, he sees corruption and decay among the bourgeoisie. 
But the bourgeoisie is already corrupting the film studios. . . . The 
Revolution comes, and is stretched to fit the frame of a romance without 
the slightest trace of irony! The plot collapses on itself, while on the 
screen we see the words ‘And in the meantime, poor Paulina. . . .’ We 
know that Eisenstein works differently, but he doesn’t count. He is a 
national park, a state-protected area.”[26] The leftist front, which 
published this article by one of the most cutting film-critics of the ‘20s, 
Viktor Shklovsky, fiercely denounced this "brainwashing" which went 
under the name of cinema, where the bourgeoisie flocked for their scrap 
of cheap daydream, given permission to “legally desert reality.”[27] The 
leftist front declared film to be among the most menacing cultural threats, 
rivaling vodka and opium, and began an aggressive attack in 1927-28 
upon “entertainment” cinema. Meanwhile, in 1928, the Party called 
together the first cinema-workers’ conference on film issues, which 
became a turning point in the life of this new medium in Soviet Russia. 
The 1930s-1950s: Collective Daydreaming 
In 1927-28, foreign-currency funding for cinema was drastically curtailed, 
which brought about radical change. First, factories had to be built to 
produce film and other equipment, which had previously been entirely 
imported from abroad, mostly from Germany . Second, the importation of 
foreign movies (by the late 1920s, these were mostly American) came to 
an abrupt halt. The viewer was left with nothing but the cinema of his 
fatherland, now hemmed in on three sides -- economically, technically, 
and ideologically. 
A new Party worker came to the head of the film industry; Boris 
Shumiatsky gained control of the restructuring process which initiated the 
incredible mass expansion of Soviet cinema. He faced several limitations: 
the number of viewers was growing while the number of movie theatres 
built and film-copies available for rent (this had become technically 
feasible with the native production of positive film) were shrinking. The 
number of pictures being produced fell rapidly. In 1928, 124 films were 
released in the Soviet Union; in 1930 there were eleven; in 1933--twenty-
nine; in 1936--forty-three; in 1947 -- twenty-three; in 1950 -- thirteen, 
and in 1951 -- nine. [28] And yet, this gradual freeze in film production 
was not initially perceived as a significant element in the development of 
Soviet cinema. At first, Shumiatsky dreamt up grandiose plans to increase 
production to 800 films a year, and envisioned wild expenditures on the 
creation of a kino-city in the Crimea , styled after Hollywood. [29] But film 
studios rarely carry out their plans. Instead of the sixteen pictures slated 
for release in 1936, Mosfilm (the most powerful studio) produced only 
thirteen. The program for expanding production was rejected; Shumiatsky 
was exposed as a saboteur and enemy of the people, who had failed to 
understand the real nature of the problems facing cinema. In 1938 he was 
arrested and shot. In the press he was damned as “fascist swine” and a 
propagator of “conveyer-belt cinema,” mass-produced, anti-
nationalist forms of “kino-americanism” (italics mine).[30] His methods, 
including the kino-city project, were oriented toward the international 
cinematic standard, instead of seeking the authentic Russian, Soviet way. 
Although the number of films being made was falling drastically, the 
number of movie theatres grew; in 1928 there were 7331 movie theatres 
in operation (almost a third of these in the country), and in 1936 there 
were 28, 931 (more than half in rural areas).[31] If new films arrived on 
the screen about every two weeks in the 1920s, by the ‘30s it took a 
month for no more than four pictures to open.[32] The number of copies 
distributed of each film was predetermined by the Central Authority of 
Cinematography. Thus there were 955 copies of “Lenin in October” 
compared to 198 copies of the adventure film “Karo.”[33] In this way the 
audience’s tastes and consumption itself were regulated and controlled. 
The people, on their part, were forced to sit through the same movie from 
a limited, rarely changing repertoire over and over, because cinema 
remained the only form of cheap entertainment. People learned movies by 
heart, and developed a specific sort of pleasure in repeated viewings, 
rather like a toddler enraptured by repeating words. 
The cut-backs in film production resulted from significant technical 
difficulties (for instance, the transition from silent to talking movies—
which was not complete in the Soviet Union until 1936, the building of 
factories to produce film equipment, the conversion of the old silent 
studios, and the construction of new studios in the republics of central 
Asia, which had no native film industry). Additional problems were caused 
by the unstable economy, controlled by the same Party/government 
apparatus which financed cinema. 
In the 1920s, financial support from the government was insignificant; the 
organization Sovkino put in about four million rubles, which might pay for 
thirty pictures—about one fourth of the total output for the year. The 
national cinema survived thanks to revenue generated by imported 
pictures and native commercial production, which brought in over sixteen 
million rubles in that same year.[34] In the thirties this situation reversed 
itself; government funding increased significantly, reaching 465 million 
rubles by 1937 (of which only 225 million were used). However, customer 
revenue in that same year only came to 20, 395 rubles.[35] Admission 
prices rose along with the state’s sweeping investment; the profit margin 
was too low to justify the immense expenditure, even after the range and 
variety of movies increased. However, in contrast to the 1920s, the 
government and the Party were prepared to free the film industry from 
the financial squeeze; that is, they took the entire financial burden of 
production and distribution upon themselves, in exchange for the right to 
participate actively in the collective creative process, on the same plane as 
the screenwriter and the director—at least, this is how Boris Shumiatsky 
defines their role in 1936.[36] This government takeover took place over 
the course of a decade, between 1928 and 1938, and at first the Party 
was not sure whether to view cinema as a commercial enterprise, 
generating income, or a state-supported means of propaganda. At the 
Fifteenth Party Congress, Stalin held on to the hope that “maybe we could 
gradually phase out vodka and bring in radio and cinema as significant 
sources of revenue,”[37] echoing Trotsky’s old ideas.[38] But even when 
these hopes remained unrealized, the politics of government spending did 
not change. The noncommercial Soviet socialist cinema that emerged at 
this time was a deliberate counterweight to Hollywood ’s materialism. 
Despite these attempts to avoid crass Western-style mercantilism, Soviet 
cinema was rarely touted as an author’s work; this enterprise, suddenly 
blessed by the government’s attention, needed to establish common 
poetics of expression—which, paradoxically, led to a homogeneity typical 
of commercial film. Both aim to be captivating and comprehensible to the 
masses. The 1928 Party Conference identified this as one of the crucial 
dilemmas facing Soviet cinema. From the outset, its development rests on 
an inherent oxymoron—noncommercial, yet requiring mass consumption. 
“In Russia , the cinema is not a form of entertainment as it is in other 
countries,” notes a British film critic. “It has a definite goal--to inculcate a 
sense of social unity,”[39] that is, to develop collective identity. 
The 1930s were dedicated to seeking out some common model for Soviet 
cinema, one to which all directors could conform, even ones as different 
as Eisenstein and Abram Roam. The development of this collective model 
required the dissolution of boundaries among genres, between creative 
and documentary film. After the second World War, for example, Stalin 
ordered creative film directors to film reenactments of its most important 
battles, ‘corrected’ to show the required outcomes. Not surprisingly, such 
epics as Vladimir Petrov’s “Stalin’s Battle ” (1946), Igor Savchenko’s “The 
Third Strike” (1948), and Mikhail Chiaurely’s “The Fall of Berlin” (1952) 
were presented as documentary dramas. Documentary film, on the other 
hand, was often acted out, with staged news footage such as the scenes 
showing the unification of the Don and Stalingrad fronts in Leonid 
Varlamov’s “ Stalingrad ” (1942). The cameraman Roman Karmen recalls 
that he was late to arrive to shoot a news report in Stalingrad , so the 
arrest of the German general Paulius was repeated in front of the camera 
by the actual participants. 
The structures of production facilitated the development of a common 
model for collective art. It was not even necessary to unionize the film 
industry, as the writers had been. The very mechanism of film production 
was easily controlled, most often by Stalin himself. His was the final word 
on everything from the film studios’ thematic plans to set design and 
shooting arrangements to the confirmation of editors and major actors. 
Sometimes these editors, directors, and actors were invited to the 
discussions. But most often Ivan Bolshakov, who took over the post of 
director of the Central Authority of Cinematography in 1939, had to 
interpret Stalin’s coughs and mutterings during a screening and decode 
them into directive instructions for the reworking of a film.[40] 
One should be able to attribute the decline in film production during this 
period to technical and economic difficulties, but contemporaries most 
often saw it as the direct result of Stalin’s censorship, which was 
buttressed by his ideas on the “production of masterpieces.” This lively 
economic theory (why devote so much energy to make many mediocre 
pictures when you can hire the best screenwriter, director, cameraman, 
composer, and actors, and make a few brilliant films?) was never really 
fixed in history, and is passed on orally as part of Soviet cinematic lore, an 
anecdote.[41] It is easily accepted as a reasonable explanation, one which 
denies any actual technical difficulties and presents Stalin’s films as the 
products of careful planning, a triumph of spirit and will over the petty 
reality of figures. Yet the cinema’s position in this highly hierarchical 
system of artistic creation in the 1930s remains ambiguous. 
In the autumn of 1936, plans were revealed for the construction of the 
Great Academic Movie Theatre, which was to tower over two of Moscow ’s 
central squares — the Red Square and the Sverdlov. This gigantic 
structure was to stand directly across from the Bolshoi Theatre and, while 
imitating its architectural style, dominate the older building visually with 
its immense height and mass. While the Bolshoi seated 2000, the movie 
theatre was to pack in twice that number.[42] A movie theatre was also 
planned for the Palace of the Soviets. This one was to seat 20,000, with 
films showing simultaneously on four separate screens. Neither project 
was carried out, but they point up the drastically increased value placed 
on cinema. If, in the 1920s, architects grouped movie theatres with other 
commercial buildings, by the 1930s they had become an independent 
architectural category. 
The marked attention focused on cinema did not change the radical 
reorientation of its function and perception: this was not a separate form 
of art, but a translator, an audio-visual receiver, a medium. In this sense 
one might consider a suggestion made by Aleksei Stakhanov, a worker-
hero who once mined fourteen times the normal amount of coal during a 
single shift. He formulated the new problem facing Soviet filmmakers.[43] 
The people want to live cultured lives, he writes in his article, but the 
scoundrels and saboteurs in charge of the film industry won’t send talking 
pictures to the coal-mining villages. And in the meantime, workers on 
the Kholkhoz (collective farm—trans.) want to listen to Beethoven. So why 
not simply film performances given by the best singers and public 
speakers? This demand in the form of a question was only one indicator of 
the commonly sanctioned view of cinema as a medium, an art form with 
no language of its own. Practically, Stakhanov’s suggestion unleashed a 
special genre of Soviet cinema—the film-concert, film-play, film-opera, 
and film-ballet. No one expected the translation of concerts or plays at the 
Khudozhestvennyi or Malyi theatres to the cinematic medium to alter 
them. No influence was ascribed to the fact of film itself. Soviet cinema 
was not alone in bringing together theatrical performances and cinema 
after the introduction of sound. Radio programs were also translated to 
film in Europe and America (for instance, “Elstree Calling,” Adrian Brunel, 
Alfred Hitchcock, 1929/30). In Hollywood popular plays and musicals are 
brought to the big screen. But in the context of the polemics among well-
known filmmakers and theorists of silent cinema (such as Rudolf Arnheim, 
René Clair, or Charlie Chaplin) about the dubious aesthetics of 
“photographed theatre,” the Soviet solution to this question seems 
especially archaic and radical. The transfer of theatrical text to the big 
screen takes place with no “cinematographization.” Cinema becomes 
simply a means of preservation, a medium for translation, and a way to 
popularize high art. It deliberately returns to the role to which it was 
relegated in the first decade of its existence. In 1914 Vladimir Mayakovsky 
summarized a widespread opinion that "Art provides us with lofty and 
meaningful images, while cinema multiplies and scatters them to the most 
remote corners of the world, much as the printing press has done with 
books. It cannot be its own separate art form."[44] 
In his memoirs Konstantin Simonov recounts a noteworthy scene: In 1940 
Stalin banned the film "The Laws of Life," and its author, Alexander 
Avdeenko, was subjected to harsh criticism. After the Central Committee 
meeting, someone asked Stalin what was to be done with the film's 
directors, Alexander Stolper and Boris Ivanov, who had also been present. 
Stalin casually twirled his finger in the air, imitating the rotation of film in 
a projector, and replied, "Them? Who cares? They just spun out the stuff 
that was written for them."[45] Cinematographers, as well as cinema 
itself, were reduced to the medium of preservation, arrangement, and 
translation of images; theirs was not an independent art. Their product is 
secondary, based on a preexisting text. In this visual medium, words are 
valued far more than images; the screenplays which began to be 
published in the journal The Art of Cinema (Iskusstvo Kino) in 1936, and 
which were later published in special editions and even anthologies, were 
subjected to particular scrutiny. Most of the censorship cases in the 1930s 
involved the literary editing of the screenplay, the dialogue, and its 
relation to the written text (of the ballet, opera, novel, or play.) 
Soviet cinema developed outgrowths such as the "revolutionary film," the 
"labor film," the "Kholkhoz film." These categories seem out of place in a 
system which has its own established cinematic genres: detective stories, 
melodramas, comedy, slapstick—all of which were acknowledged to be 
cinematic because of their well-developed and clearly defined patterns of 
motion (the chase scene in detective stories; the gags and motorcycle 
stunts in slapstick; the dramatic buildup resolved with a last-minute 
rescue in melodrama). The nebulous definitions of "revolutionary," "labor," 
and "Kholkhoz"resulted in some peculiar hybrids of established genres. 
Revolutionary films borrowed from the old monumental pictures, with 
their mass scenes and apotheoses (for example, Carmine Gallone's "Quo 
Vadis" or Griffith's "Intolerance"), which also made effective use of 
teeming masses, battle scenes, and staged catastrophes (floods, fire, 
volcanic eruption). Only instead of the burning of Rome or the Babylonian 
siege, the Soviet version tackled a single, eternally unchanging, national 
mass action: the Revolution. A prototype for Soviet monumental films of 
the 1930s became "We, the People of Kronstadt" (1936) by Vsevolod 
Vishnevsky and Efim Dzigan: it got rid of the nominal romance of 
struggling lovers set against the background of grand historical spectacle, 
and retained only the kinetics of the mass scenes. In the other films—
about labor and life on the Kholkhoz—the love story is but an insignificant 
detour from the main plot of socialist struggle or the emancipation of 
women. Comedies, which revolved entirely around romantic intrigue, were 
harshly criticized or even banned outright, as was the case with 
Konstantin Iudin's belatedly released "The Heart of Four" (1941). 
Even the weakest romantic subplots, such as the love story between Anka 
and Petka in "Chapaev" by the Vasiliev brothers (1934) was viewed as a 
relic of "the faceless international stewpot of storylines, with its lazy 
dependence on genres and pseudo-reality," "a rote tribute to 
Americanism."[46] As opposed to the films of the '20s, which brought to 
the fore the chaotic movement of the collective body ("The Battleship 
Potemkin"), the monumental films of the '30s have the organized moving 
masses revolving around their director — Stalin. Soviet film could only 
achieve total expression when it ceased to be a medium for other art 
forms (the traditional, hence unworthy path), and became its own reality 
and most importantly, its own version of history. The Soviet monumental 
films were peculiar not only in their rejection of tried-and-true narrative 
structures. The cinema took on the role of a chronicler, which merely 
modified its existing intermediary status. 
In the 1930s a single subject became the theme for all manner of art 
forms -- from novels, plays, opera, ballet, and film to miniatures, 
sculptures, and monuments. Cinema managed to develop and elaborate 
this established trope with more refinement than any of the others. The 
same subject was thought out, planned out, peppered with new details in 
various films which, when taken together, formed a sort of fictional place 
and time which nonetheless came into sharper and sharper focus with 
each new production. Almost every leading Soviet film director shot the 
history of the October uprising. Beginning with Sergei Eisenstein's 
"October" in 1927, this story came out onto the big screen every decade, 
for the anniversary of the Revolution, with a ready supply of component 
parts and often in several different films. In 1937-38 the first group of 
these pictures was produced: Mikhail Romm's "Lenin in October," Mikhail 
Chiuareli's "The Great Fiery Glow," Grigorii Koznitsev and Leonid 
Trauberg's "The Vyborg Side," and Sergei Iutkevich's "The Man with the 
Gun." Since these films presented the exact same historical events, an 
episode from one screenplay could easily be transferred to another, as it 
happened when Stalin ordered the scene of dispersing the administrative 
meeting to migrate from Iutkevich's screenplay to Koznitsev and 
Trauberg's film. In Romm's "Lenin in October," Lenin gives the worker 
Vasilii an article to pass along to Stalin in the Pravda offices; in Chiaureli's 
"The Great Fiery Glow" Stalin reads over Lenin's article in Pravda's 
editorial offices; and in "The Man with the Gun" soldiers in the trenches 
read the article which Lenin published in Pravda. In Romm's film Lenin 
writes something undiscernable to the viewer in a notebook, while in 
Chiaureli's the camera zooms in on the notebook so that the words may 
be read. Stalin, who stands silently before a map in Romm's film, gives 
audible orders to seize the Central Post Office in Chiaureli's. Romm shows 
the actual storming of the post office. When the soldiers write a letter to 
Lenin in Iutkevich's film, it is read in Chiaureli's. The question of agrarian 
reform which is raised in Iutkevich's film is answered in Romm's. "The 
Vyborg Side" opens with the final shot and closing lines of "Lenin in 
October." They are overheard by the film's protagonist, who is returning 
to the Bolsheviks' military headquarters in Smolny after the arrest of the 
Provisional Government, which had been shown by Chiuareli and Romm. 
Several shots become canonical, to be reproduced again and again. For 
instance, Romm borrowed the composition and mise-en-scene of 
Eisenstein's storming of the Winter Palace through the front gates 
("October," 1927), which was more visually effective, though unfaithful to 
the actual course of events. Iutkevich later uses this black-and-white 
scene as an example of an actual newscast in his color film "Tales of 
Lenin" (1957). There are disparities as well: Romm has Lenin protected by 
the worker Vasilii rather than Eino Rakhia, his actual bodyguard, who had 
already been "repressed" by the time of the film's making. Chiuareli has 
Stalin himself take on this role of guardian angel. This maniacal 
refinement of the fictional details of the October uprising affirms the 
historical myth. Stalin's opponents, who were condemned during the 
purges of 1936-38, were presented in these films as enemies of the 
people even back then, in 1917. Lenin's presence in these films serves as 
a backdrop for Stalin's actions. In Romm's "Lenin in October," Stalin helps 
Lenin to a hideaway on the Finnish Gulf to escape Kamenev and Zinoviev 
(the latter accompanied Lenin in reality). In "Lenin in 1918," also by 
Romm, it is Stalin rather than Trotsky who wins the civil war and saves 
Russia from famine, sending grain from the Volga to the central regions, 
while Lenin recuperates from the assassination attempt organized by the 
Socialist Revolutionaries and masterminded by Nikolai Bukharin! These 
films were the first of many commemorative films, all of which reenacted 
the revolution decade after decade with endless historical corrections. 
History became cinema's independent creation — an eternally variable 
present, and cinema truly became a collective art, reaching much further 
than the frame of a single picture. All films became a collective 
undertaking. "Film is an illusion, but it dictates its laws to life," Stalin said 
in 1924.[47] This conviction greatly helped to affirm the illusion of "the 
most important of all the arts," of the people's collective daydream about 
their past and present. It is no accident that all individual artistic detail is 
banished from the collective dream. 
Another type of drama, the private drama, along the lines of Alexander 
Rzhevsky's emotional screenplays, was proposed at the beginning of the 
1930s. But if the monumental film minus the romantic subplot was 
approved, then a film based on an emotional screenplay, however weak 
the narrative, was rejected; most of the films based on Rzhevsky's 
screenplays were banned or never finished ("The Ocean," "The Storm," 
"The Enthusiast's Way," Eisenstein's "Bezhin Field" of 1935-37). The 
emotional screenplay interspersed the normal plot (generally a 
melodrama) with various seemingly meaningless associations, frequently 
nostalgic (as in Vsevolod Pudovkin's "A Simple Ooccurrence," 1932) or 
wistful (as in Boris Barent's "By the Bluest Sea," 1935, which was based 
on a screenplay written by a man who had been involved with the Oberiut 
group, Konstantin Mints). This type of interjection, permissible in a quasi-
historical chronicle, was considered unacceptable in any other genre and 
characterized as "illiterate pulp ravings," "paeans to the elements of chaos 
and crude naturalism."[48] With a bit of stretch one could view the 
rejection of this model as the rejection of the audience's subjective 
identification with the story on the screen, and especially with the 
seemingly out-of-plot images (dreams, memories, moods); more 
generally, it could be seen as objectivity forcing out subjectivity, to the 
point of removing the subjective perspective and every means of directing 
the individual's view codified in the '20s: the handheld camera, smooth 
transitions, the emphasis on foreshortening. The camera must be firmly 
affixed to its stand, the height of which is determined by the height of the 
table. Horizon lines set too high or too low are avoided, and panned shots 
are almost entirely absent. Real space is replaced more and more 
frequently with the space of utopian reality; thus filmmakers abandon the 
streets and move into the studio, where a backdrop replaces the horizon, 
canvas replaces stone, buildings become false fronts, where space is 
entirely subject to the whims of the screenwriter and the light man. For 
two decades, from the 1930s to the mid-1950s, every set is constructed in 
the studio—the Winter Palace and Paris during the Commune, waterfalls, 
Arctic icebergs, deserts, taiga, the Volga . Eisenstein's "Ivan the Terrible" 
(1946) might be interpreted in this context as a claustrophobic film about 
closed, constructed space, which swallows up its characters. The 
cameraman's skill is now judged not by his choice of foreshortening or his 
handling of texture, but by his ability to lend depth to a flat canvas, 
sharpness to a hand-painted backdrop, the combination of nature with 
last-minute paint jobs in the studio, his ability to work with artificial light, 
to splice together hand-drawn, constructed, and real objects, smoothing 
out their differences with cinematic technique. Cameramen must master 
all the techniques of illusion — working with dummies and mannequins, 
rear-projection and transparent shots, maneuvers which the cinema of the 
'20s had shunned as "magic tricks" and pointless mesmerizing 
distractions. Lev Kosmatov, the cameraman on all of Mikhail Chiuareli's 
films, became a master of this, as did Vladimir Nilsen, Grigorii 
Alexandrov's cameraman, who in 1927 translated a book by Guido Seber, 
a leading German cameraman-trickster, entitled The Technique of 
Cinematic Tricks. 
Cameramen had to avoid protocol photography as well as all outside 
effects. Using light and watercolor to retouch a face was not considered 
formalism, yet the frequent use of soft optics was perceived as 
"unpleasant effete wateriness"; Iakov Protazanov was reprimanded for 
this weakness during the filming of "The Bride with No Dowry" 
(1936).[49] The choice of unjustified camera angles inspired even harsher 
criticism than the choice of optics. The camera's path is usually motivated 
by an individual's perspective, but since the subjective point of view was 
forbidden, the "randomly" moving camera disappeared with it. In Lev 
Kuleshov's "The Siberians" (1941), the camera shares the viewpoint of a 
boy lying in the back of a cart, who is gradually losing consciousness. The 
panorama of swirling treetops inspired reproachful comments about 
unnatural camera shots and formalism. Oleg Leonidov, a film reviewer, 
was of the opinion that presenting the world from the perspective of the 
protagonist, particularly a protagonist who is about to pass out, was 
unacceptable.[50] 
The neutralization of cinematographic modes of expression was a pre-
programmed phenomenon. Individual language is avoided, the artificial 
folklorization of art becomes a palliative escape route — analyzed in 
recent works by historians of Soviet film as the formalization of 
mythological consciousness.[51 This is how the old quandary of Russian 
film is modified: the modern is made archaic and the individual is 
dissolved in the collective. 
Modern Times. Siamese Twins 
After the Party's first open reevaluation of its own history at the 50th 
Party Congress in 1956, after the revelation of the atrocities committed 
during the great terror and the debunking of Stalin, the history of Soviet 
cinema seemed to begin anew once more, which was again manifested in 
galloping numbers. During the course of five years the number of films 
produced grew tenfold, from nine pictures in 1951 to 104 in 1956 and 150 
in 1969. New film studios were built, and new technologies were 
mastered: there were now more films made in color (in 1966 they made 
up one third of the yearly production; in 1969 more than half, 82 out of 
150 [52] as well as wide screen films (two in 1956; 67 in 1966) and 70 
mm wide-format films (one in 1960; 9 in 1969). The number of movie 
theatres tripled, and the politics of distribution changed radically once 
again. 1949 was the first year in which the Soviet viewer could see foreign 
movies, after a prolonged delay; at first they were trophy films brought 
back from Germany , and afterward foreign films distributed for profit and 
screened at the Moscow Film Festival (resumed after a twenty-four year 
hiatus) — also called Foreign Film Week. The liberation of film from the 
tight grip of the collective model, the open distribution, and the increase 
in theatre seating led to a doubling of the number of filmgoers within the 
space of ten years, with almost five million visiting the theatres in 
1968.[53] The profit margin grew, and even at the beginning of the 
1980s, when the number of filmgoers was reduced to the level of 
1960,[54] and ticket prices never surpassed 70 kopecks, cinema still 
brought in 16.4 million rubles in revenue. 
Directors of different generations worked side by side in the film studios — 
relics from the '20s and '30s, veterans of cold war cinema, alongside the 
new prodigies (Grigorii Chukharii, Sergei Bondaruchnik) and twenty- and 
thirty-year olds who had never experienced war, making their debut just 
barely after receiving their degrees, such as Andrei Tarkovsky and Andrei 
Mikhalkov-Konchalovsky. In its entire rich history of extreme variability, 
Soviet cinema had never achieved such rapid changes in terms of 
economics, structure, technology, and creativity. 
Russian cinema now followed the international model of presenting 
anonymous reality with no attempt at interpretation, not subject to the 
ideological machinations of language. This was the aesthetic of Italian 
neorealism, British “free cinema,” French cinéma verité and nouvelle 
vague, and the new wave of filmmaking in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Its 
features included long shots, natural sunlight instead of artificial studio 
lighting, streets and original interiors instead of constructed film sets, 
amateur rather than professional actors, black and white instead of 
Technicolor, de-dramatization instead of intrigue, and a “dilletante” 
aesthetic taking precedence over mastery and skill. Noise is valued above 
dialogue. Characters wander mutely and aimlessly through the city 
instead of engaging in scripted, dramatic conversation. The camera 
observes life’s random flow, registers minute changes in the appearance 
of people and city streets, in human communication, in all matters of 
movement and nuance and speech; films such as Marlena Khutsieva’s “I 
Am 20 Years Old” (1961-64) or “July Rain” (1967) become far more 
captivating than the traditional scripted storylines. The new style is also 
perceived as the unequivocal redemption of a “reality” freed from 
ideological constraints, as described in books by André Bazin and Siegfried 
Kracauer (whose translation into Russian was long overdue).[55] In this 
context montage was viewed as a trick that undermined cinematic 
integrity by manipulating the viewer’s attention and consequently his 
opinion. Andrei Tarkovsky defined his technique as the aesthetics of 
“capturing time” and accused Eisenstein of misunderstanding the laws of 
cinematography.[56] 
While Soviet film directors consider themselves indebted to neorealism, 
the neorealists declared their model to be Mark Donskoi, famous for his 
screen adaptations of Maksim Gorky’s autobiographical stories 
“Childhood,” “In Public,” and “My Universities” (1936-39). The French 
emulate the work of Dziga Vertov, and the very term cinéma 
vérité originated as a translation of Vertov’s “kino-reality.” However, these 
outward stylistic similarities with world cinema do not negate the deeply 
rooted foundation of Soviet cinema — socialist utopianism. 
The October Revolution and the second World War remained the central 
historical events in collective memory, and the preservation of socialist 
society was still outside the grasp of an individual person. This hierarchy 
of values and unshakeable core of social organization severely limited 
opportunities for innovation in dramatic structures. The parables at the 
center of most contemporary films (exposing the enemy, reeducating the 
individualist, emancipating women) remained essentially unchanged, but 
with slightly different emphasis: the enemy was no longer a foreign spy, 
but a conservative, a bureaucrat, or simply a cynic; the reeducation story 
is somewhat ameliorated in the form of comedy; the emancipation story, 
in contrast, moves from the comedic genre into drama. The working 
woman is vulgar and smokes; her working husband does not understand 
classical music and has only a tenuous grasp of grammar. These simple 
shifts in the proletarian myth which Soviet cinema had propagated for 
decades were now received as signs of renewal. “Truth” is declared to be 
the crucial criterion for art, leaving only “superficial” visual similarities 
with English or French film. Unshaven actors, worn and rumpled clothes, 
poverty in the home, filth and muck in the streets -- these come to be 
seen as evidence of “truth” and lend verisimilitude to stories of everyday 
life. Filmmakers applied this style equally to contemporary plots, historical 
pictures, and screen adaptations of literary classics. Grigorii Koznitsev 
does “neorealistic” Shakespeare (“Hamlet,” 1964) and Mikhail Schweitzer 
adapts Tolstoy in the neorealist style (“Resurrection,” 1960-61). Yet the 
fact that all of these changes were minimal was nowhere more evident 
than in that most traditional genre of Soviet cinema: the Revolutionary 
film. 
Of all the Stalinist films, only Chiuareli’s were banned outright. Stalin’s 
image was deleted -- often by complicated technical maneuvers such as 
rear-projection and the retouching of each individual frame -- from all of 
the other ‘30s films. Mikhail Romm even re-shot several scenes for “Lenin 
in 1918” twenty years after the original movie. Yet the historical concept 
behind these films remained untouched, and after undergoing the process 
of technical “de-Stalinization” they were re-released to condition and train 
the collective memory. Sergei Iutkevich re-filmed old commemorative 
stories of Lenin in the ‘50s, ‘60s, and even into the ‘80s. The historical 
fiction of these films acquired a new documentary style. While Stalin’s 
image disappears from the screen (much as his embalmed body 
disappears from the mausoleum), the figure of Lenin is bestowed with a 
variety of new, day-to-day details (we see him riding a bicycle, lost in 
thought and wandering aimlessly down forest trails, sometimes sitting in 
meaningful silence, indecisive at times, going to the movies -- just like a 
character in any of the contemporary 1960s films) and finds a new form of 
expression -- much like the protagonist of some modern French novel -- in 
silent inner monologues (“Lenin in Poland,” 1965, “Lenin in Paris,” 1981). 
The camera’s objective distance and various small signs of 
individualization (the inner monologue, handheld camera, the expressive 
use of foreshortening) make up the stylistic frame of 1960s cinema, which 
sought -- for the first time in the history of Soviet film -- an individual 
hero. 
In the ecstatic mass scenes which became the hallmark of 1920s cinema, 
the individual dissolved in a teeming sea of bodies; in the ‘30s, the 
cinematic hero symbolically represented the working class on the screen, 
nobly subject to the common fate. Without questioning the essentiality of 
this subjugation, the films of the ‘60s frequently revealed its 
inherent drama, exploring the destruction of personality. In “Ivan’s 
Childhood” (1961) Andrei Tarkovsky’s protagonist is a child who has been 
driven mad by war and has become its machine. The blame is shifted to a 
blind and merciless historical cataclysm, which strips the individual of all 
freedom and will. Italian Communists accused Tarkovsky of historical 
fatalism and a lack of faith in progress after his film won the Golden Lion 
award at the Venice film festival, and, not surprisingly, Jean-Paul Sartre 
emerged as one of his staunchest supporters.[57] 
The most significant change of the decade came with the gradual shift of 
public interest toward the fate of the individual, one excluded from the 
common biography. Even Ivan Pyriev, the director of 
countless Kholkhoz pastorals in the 1930s, now filmed three consecutive 
novels of Dostoyevsky’s—all of which had been taboo for two decades: 
“The Idiot” (1958), “White Nights” (1960), and “The Brothers Karamazov” 
(1968). Young French film critics immediately took note of this shift. 
Regarding the screen adaptation of Chekhov’s “Jumping Girl” (by Samson 
Samsonov, 1955), François Truffaut wrote: “An adulterer in a Soviet film! 
Now we can finally breathe a sigh of relief!” For the first time he could 
draw parallels between films from “over there” (from Russia), which had 
previously struck him as nothing more than archaic “fairy tales,” and 
something more familiar, such as Max Ophuls’s melodramas.[58] For the 
first and last time in its history, a Russian film about an unfaithful wife 
(Mikhail Kalatozov’s “The Cranes Are Flying,” 1957) won the Palme d’Or at 
the 1958 Cannes Film Festival. 
Soviet film critics often did not know what to make of these new 
characters -- the unfaithful bride Veronica in “The Cranes Are Flying”; the 
Red guerrilla fighter who falls in love with a White officer (“’41” by Grigorii 
Chukhrai, 1956); or the hardened child for whom war is the only reality, 
while life is a dream (“Ivan’s Childhood”). At long last, the soldier Andrei 
Sokolov (in Sergei Bondarchuk’s “A Man’s Fate,” 1959) can be enshrouded 
in his own, personaltragedy, apart from the overall euphoria of victory, 
even despite triumph over the Reichstag! 
A historical cataclysm, whether it be the War or the Revolution, was an 
indispensable backdrop to the individual’s break with collective destiny 
and righteousness. An emotional, biological experience (such as fear, 
survival instinct, erotic passion) serves to justify and ensure the 
emancipation of an individual’s personality, yet the cataclysm sets 
the individual experience as an exception to the collective, thereby 
mitigating the radical nature of the change. Moreover, in any mass action 
(such as war) one will always find a collective chorus to stand apart and 
comment upon the individual’s fate. In Grigorii Chukhrai’s “The Ballad of a 
Soldier” (1959) this chorus serves to correct and guide the hero’s actions; 
the lovers in “The Cranes are Flying” do not just wander along deserted 
beaches, but also before the primary symbol of Soviet collective identity 
— the mausoleum. As the Red guerrilla fighter falls into a forbidden love, 
her dead comrades come to her in dreams. The camera's liberation, its 
accentuated expressiveness, was inextricably linked to this new, 
subjective, "intimate" take on historical experience. Cameramen such as 
Sergei Urusevsky and Vadim Iusov now rivaled the top directors in fame. 
Yet the strong independent personality in film was presented mostly as an 
exception—one which carried subtle and inherent risks. Thus the 
protagonist is frequently a criminal (as in Vasilii Shukshin's 1974 film "The 
Red Rose," in which the eccentric personality belongs to a professional 
thief), or else slightly psychotic (the same Shukshin's unconventional 
cranks in his films "There Was Once a Fellow…" [1964] and "Just One 
Word, Please" [1975]), or he is condemned to loneliness and solitude as 
one of the "chosen" -- the great historical figure, the artist. Perhaps only 
two directors—Andrei Tarkovsky and Sergei Paradzhanov -- rejected these 
palliative options in favor of asserting individuality on the Russian screen, 
and vehemently defended the author's autonomy in the artistic realm; this 
was so untraditional within that singular construct called "Russian Cinema" 
that it actually leaned more toward the Western European tradition, where 
these two became better known than any of their Russian colleagues. 
Paradzhanov creates a new image of the autonomous eccentric -- now he 
is a homosexual, a blasphemer, an aesthete, a camp prisoner. Beginning 
with "The Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors" (Ukranian, 1964) he 
established himself as a director with a particular archaic style, which was 
further developed as his own, Paradzhanov's, personal vision in "The Color 
of Granite" (Armenian, 1969) and "The Legend of the Suramsky Fortress" 
(Georgian, 1984). His camera remains markedly still; spatially, each 
frame is flat, with frontal composition and no sense of linear perspective; 
the actors' gestures are ritualized; the deliberately chosen color scheme is 
restricted to red, blue, yellow, and black, all in stark definition. 
Paradzhanov makes do without the use of montage; each shot, each 
frame is constructed and presented as a painting, and demands careful 
perusal, as if the viewer, contrary to all laws of cinematography, is not to 
associate one frame with the next but must rather immerse himself in the 
depths of a flat space, much as he would regard a painted canvas. Each 
shot is overladen with meaningful details -- the symbolism of color, 
costumes, the poetic text, which underlies all of his films; the enigmatic, 
ritualized movement of the actors. Each of these seemingly symbolic 
details cannot and in fact should not be deciphered, because their 
meaning is freely invented by the director himself, and changes just as 
freely from film to film. The aesthetic beauty of Paradzhanov's 
compositions seems to dominate all other meaning, yet in his non-
narrative, stylistically naïve movies he manages to convey tragic and 
philosophical ideas about death and sacrifice, exile and the loss of faith, 
the loss of love, the loss of memory. Every one of Paradzhanov's films 
ends on death's doorstep and is laced through with a tragic worldview, in 
sharp contrast to the decorative, sensual, and highly unstable beauty of 
his "textual" cinematic world. 
Paradzhanov's unyielding conception of cinema as form and even as fable 
in his 1964 directorial debut ("The Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors") first 
makes evident his deliberate break with Soviet tradition. The Hutzul (a 
Ukranian inhabitant of the Carpathian region-trans.) loses his beloved and 
hence every remaining tie to life. Paradzhanov also approaches the 
relation between the individual and the collective (a crucial theme in 
1960s cinema) on a different level: as his individual characters break from 
their family and heritage, the artist Paradzhanov perfects his distinctive 
individual language. Students of Russian film generally interpret this 
transition from an alien ritual and canon to a more personal form of 
expression as the transition from mythical to Christian (hence individual) 
thought patterns.[59] But it can also be understood as the development of 
a personal artistic language, marked in Pradzhanov's work by his use of 
color and the overall sense of space. 
Andrei Tarkovsky's conception of an "author-created" film revolved around 
the traditional narrative of individual choice, which torments the 
characters of all of his pictures—from "Andrei Rublev" (1966-71) to 
"Nostalgia" (1983) and "Oferet" (1985), which Tarkovsky made after his 
emigration. Tarkovsky's assertion of his right to an individual viewpoint, 
unhampered by any authority but his own, and to autonomy in his artistic 
creation, generated his fundamental conflict not only with the authorities 
governing "State-Cinema" but also with the entire Soviet cinematic 
tradition, which left no room for aesthetic or ideological differences. (It is 
telling that one of the leading directors of the 1930s, Sergei Gerasimov, 
identified this as an ethical conflict: "This is an overestimation of one's 
own persona, which is exclusionary: 'I am an individual phenomenon and 
therefore I can make judgments unchecked even by the conscience and 
reason of the people . . . . ' Such a position has nothing whatsoever to do 
with our Communist morale."[60] 
In his later book, Sculpturing in Time, Tarkovsky muses not so much 
about cinema, art, and aesthetics as about the relations between the 
individual and society, freedom and conscience, the physical and the 
eternal. He sees the twentieth century as the end of the Great Inquisition 
and the persecution of ideas; he believes that society can gradually 
become more and more just, and offer new and more enlightened means 
for the world's salvation. This idea of world salvation must include the 
thoughts and actions of the loner, who has over time lost his ability to 
think and feel. "World evolution is a collective effort" -- in each of his 
films, Tarkovsky countered this maxim with the concept of individual 
effort, which can affect history, civilization's progress or regression, and 
even, in some mystical sense, the very fate of the world (as in "The 
Sacrifice"). Though in that particular film the hero must sacrifice two of his 
individual hypostases -- his home and his voice -- in order to save the 
world from global catastrophe. 
In Tarkovsky's view, art exists to give form to the fragile, easily lost 
individual experience, memory, feeling, dreams. Thus his best-known, 
most characteristic movie is probably "The Mirror" (1974) -- the first film-
autobiography in the history of Soviet cinema, which even Tarkovsky's 
faithful cameraman, Vadim Iusov, considered to be beneath the common 
conception of art and fit only for amateur 8mm family film. 
Although his subjectivity links him with author-driven Western filmmaking, 
Tarkovsky also fits the stereotype of the enigmatic, metaphysical, 
impenetrable Russian soul -- only this stereotype was no longer couched 
in Eisenstein's exemplary montage sequences, which had fixed the idea of 
the "divided Slavic soul" in Western imagination, but in the agonizingly 
drawn-out plan-séquences, in which the viewer loses all sense of 
direction, where actors whirl around the camera and the camera circles 
among the actors, and contrasts are built not around the junctions 
between shots but upon depth and proximity, different signposts, 
contrasts between shadow and light, warm and cold light, a shot's slowed 
tempo -- supported by a magnification of time and elliptical leaps among 
various historical and cultural strata. 
This same aggressive defense of subjective experience can be found in the 
films of Kira Muratova, who provocatively aestheticized the "banal" as the 
antithesis of the now meaningless "provincial melodrama" genre ("Long 
Wires," 1972; "Discovering the White Light," 1984), or in the films of 
Aleksei German, who found a "cinematographically individual" form of 
expression in reconstructing "the greater meaning" of history, which had 
been erased from intimate memory, forgotten "in general," and restored 
only in loose, scattered details in the mind. All of the characters in his 
landmark film "My Friend Ivan Lapshyn" (1984) recall the past 
"incorrectly" in this sense because they generally lack the ability to 
perceive reality and themselves within that reality. These characters 
completely subjugate their individual differences to the commonly 
accepted norm: the journalist trying to shoot himself cannot fathom that 
Mayakkovsky had committed suicide; the actress, who is miserably in love 
with the journalist and in turn scorns the unrequited love of the military 
officer, is amused by the clumsy love affairs between Chekhov's 
characters. The epileptic military officer, who is also a militia detective, 
expounds on the health of society and future plans for building public 
parks, all against the backdrop of a vacant lot and a ditch, from which 
mutilated corpses are being unearthed behind him. To German this 
represents the tragicomic inability to see the actual results of the medial 
experiment -- Soviet cinema, which, more so than any other art in Soviet 
history, had impressed a particular worldview upon every member of 
society. For this reason he bases the aesthetics of his work on a rejection 
of the "Soviet film" aesthetic created by the collective efforts of 
filmmakers in the 1930s-50s: the clear shots, stationary camera, clear 
sound quality to convey the crucial symbolic weight of the dialogue, were 
all replaced with shaky camera-work and skewed asymmetrical 
composition, in which random "unimportant" details are constantly 
obscuring the protagonist, or simply the speaker, from view. The 
complicated soundtrack, with its multiple overlays of noise, makes it 
almost impossible to discern words through the din, bits of garbled 
dialogue, and scraps of melody. 
Yet these examples -- German, Muratova, Tarkovsky -- make plain that 
the construct of Soviet cinema as such was a necessary element in their 
'emancipation'; they are like Siamese twins and, once separated from one 
another, once viewed outside their context, they lose their subversive 
premise and their audience—that is, the viewer familiar with Soviet 
cinema. In the 1970s, during the so-called "period of stagnation," the 
social split between conformists and dissidents, the division of art into 
official and outlawed categories, and the "Siamese twin" relationship 
between Soviet and individual film became too obvious. Soviet cinema had 
to make one final heroic effort to restore the disappearing reverence for 
the collective. Thus films by Tarkovsky ("Andrei Rublev," screen 
adaptations of "The Idiot" or screenplays written along the lines of 
Hoffman), Muratova, and German were banned. The old familiar mass-
action films were resurrected on 70 mm film, in glorious full color and 
stereophonic sound. Yuri Ozerov begins a military epic which spans twenty 
years and eleven films, from "The Liberation" (1970-72) to "Stalingrad" 
(1989), in which he once again offers up the battles of the second World 
War as part of the collective biography, with Stalin and his field marshal 
(either Zhukov or Rokossovsky) as the protagonists and thousands of 
anonymous soldiers. These films might be viewed as a remake of Stalin's 
"Ten Strikes" project, which had included films such as "The Battle of 
Stalingrad," "The Third Strike," and "The Fall of Berlin." Sergei 
Bondarchuk undertakes a similar remake, recreating the October 
Revolution once again ("Red Bells," 1982), though this time with a 
nominal attempt at historical accuracy. He introduces the quasi-realistic 
character of the foreign correspondent and eyewitness John Reed into the 
traditional, fictional cinematic space, but ultimately Reed is mute, an extra 
instead of a chronicler of events. The "anonymous" film retained its role as 
historical medium, and in these Bondarchuk repeats scenes from all of the 
familiar old Soviet films—though on a new technical level, with better film, 
optics, and recording equipment. 
In this same decade of the '70s, when journalism, literature, theatre, and 
film first became actively involved in discussing economic reform, civil 
rights, education, and ecology, the model of '30s cinema emerged not as 
a directive from above, but out of a specific and inherent artistic need. 
These filmmakers did not see themselves as slaves to ideology, but rather 
as the tutors of a nation, as messiahs, which lent their work an entirely 
different weight and value. For such a mission, constructs such as 
autonomous art, which Paradzhanov embraced so heartily, were entirely 
too narrow. 
The concept of Soviet film became fragmented and scattered enough to 
include very disparate phenomena: state-ordered epics in the vein of 
Ozerov's tank-operas; Bondarchuk's colossal endeavors; the subversive, 
socially thought-provoking films of Gleb Panfilov; Tarkovsky's stubborn 
individual authorship; and also a vast number of unremarkable, mediocre 
Soviet melodramas which, however (unlike Tarkovsky, Bondarchuk, or 
Panfilov), enjoyed enormous popularity—for example, Victor Rogovoy's 
1971 film "The Officers" attracted 70 million viewers in the first year after 
its release![61] But when even Russian viewers stopped attending the 
cinema it became necessary to gamble on the native film-entertainment 
industry and the "Hollywood-ization" of Soviet film, to the degree to which 
ideological doctrine would permit, or course. Suddenly, the State-Cinema 
itself was demanding staged historical films, imitations of Western models, 
comedies, melodramas, socialist films about natural catastrophes -- 
flouting all previously established guidelines. But Russia lost the arms race 
on the cinematic-empire front, and Soviet cinema's time ran out almost 
simultaneously with the fall of the Soviet Union. 
During the short period of glasnost, between the end of the 1980s and the 
beginning of the '90s, Russian cinema saw a boom in production once 
again; it is impossible to recount exactly the number of films made per 
year (whether it was 400, 500, or 600), but there was talk of the new 
Hong Kong or the new Bombay, which would replace the socialist system 
of film production. However, the boom ultimately proved not to be the 
beginning of a new epoch, but a death-rattle. The entire hierarchy of 
values was changing. Banned films were suddenly acknowledged as 
masterpieces of the "period of stagnation"; marginalized directors took the 
places of government laureates, previously occupied by the likes of 
Bondarchuk. Once more history is rewritten in film, as part of the eternal 
quest for the contemporary moment which Soviet cinema eternally 
adjusted and revised. Instead of analytically debunking the old cinematic 
myths, filmmakers of the perestroika era industriously went to work 
imposing new ones, switching around the symbols of value. Stalin 
becomes firmly entrenched on the Russian screen, though not as a god 
but as a demon of history; crosses and ruined churches replace the red 
stars and banners; instead of the commissars, the royal family is 
romanticized and sanctified as victims of the Revolution. Anti-Stalin films 
rapidly replaced the cultish paeans, but did not change the hierarchy of 
genres in the old model of Soviet cinema. Although the authoritarian 
structures suppressing individualism had supposedly been removed and 
societal mainstays destroyed, the formerly Soviet cinema could not seem 
to find its own autonomous identity. However, during the course of 
the perestroika years it achieved a quality of aggressive realism 
unprecedented in Russian film. "Little Vera" (1988), a slight and mediocre 
film by the young director Vasilii Pichul, deliberately shocked Russian 
audiences. Pichul discovered in Soviet society a mass person without 
individual consciousness, and the critics were horrified that a Russian 
should fall into the stream of Western twentieth century progression, 
losing all touch with the cherished national tradition of spiritual 
superiority. Besides this, the film presented naked reality with no 
apologies or appeals to the ideological, metaphorical, pantheistic, or 
metaphysical sensibilities. For this reason this mediocre film appeared so 
novel and produced such a sensation. Yet the novelty was 
essentially stylistic, and soon filth, ruined buildings, gutted factories, 
industrial wastelands, and communal apartments were taken up by the 
new wave of filmmakers as a photogenic natural environment. These ugly 
yet aestheticized backdrops set the scene for a variety of narratives about 
the decay of Soviet structures, especially its long-standing artistic taboos 
against sex and violence. At the same time popular culture, which had 
previously been suppressed much like the elite or the subversives, began 
to assimilate sex, violence, and destruction into its own stories, without 
the aestheticization. 
Meanwhile viewers were no longer seeing Soviet films in the theatres; the 
movie-theatres were glutted with the products of the American and 
Western European entertainment industries, which led to an odd 
reorientation. Directors made movies—pretty much as they had before—
with an imaginary viewer in mind, but the viewer's desires began to be 
calculated by Western measures, and the new Russian cinema began to 
adapt a foreign culture to post-Soviet film: the strong individual hero, 
supremely sure of himself and confident in his own perceptions, has to 
destroy the ideology of collective obedience totally and single-handedly 
modernize Russian-Soviet society. Criminals, prostitutes, Hell's Angels on 
motorcycles (usually portrayed as killers-for-hire in these plots) moved 
into Russia's cinematic world. Russian filmmakers began to populate post-
Soviet reality with the aimless figures of Western cinema, lagging perhaps 
by a decade or two: thus Moscow in the 1990s came to know American 
hippies and Hell's Angels, mafiosi from the gangster thrillers of the early 
'70s, or the Russian Rambo, relocated to spread mayhem and fight for 
justice in the bloody Chechnyan conflict. 
Yet it was not this amalgamation that truly washed away the traces of 
Soviet cinema. It seems more likely that the final blow was dealt by 
filmmakers such as Elem Klimov and Andrei Smirnov, who had enjoyed a 
brief period of authority during perestroika. They managed to dismantle 
the structures of state financing for films and the entrenched distribution 
methods, and initiated the struggle against the "average, grey, mediocre 
movie," which in turn resulted in the destruction of Soviet cinema. The 
glut of "grey movies," "state-sponsored movies," and vulgar 
entertainment had to be replaced with socially engaging or artistic 
pictures. The program put forth by these filmmakers recalled Stalin's 
"masterpiece" theory: why make so many middle-of-the-road movies, 
when one could make a few works of genius? In this way the idea of 
commercially based national film production was annulled -- and without 
it, large-scale films were impossible to make. 
Eventually the system of film financing collapsed completely in the 
confusion of chaotic capitalism. The only survivors were rather marginal 
affairs — alternative cinema (called "parallel" in Russia), or experimental 
films which did not rely on mass distribution and were aimed solely at 
specific audiences and the film festivals, such as Alexander Sokurov's 
"Mother and Son" (1997). The marked attention that Russian cinema had 
received on the international film scene during glasnost evaporated. 
Distributors, Soviet audiences, and international film festivals were no 
longer interested in Stalin, perestroika, or the absurdities of post-Soviet 
life. (The film festivals had turned the spotlight on films coming out of 
China, Africa, Iran, or Taiwan.) Now nostalgia set in. Post-Soviet viewers 
began to enjoy the old Soviet films just as they had been viewed in the 
'30s-'70s, with a childlike glee in repeated viewings—only now, of course, 
on television. Out of the 6,500 speaking films made in the USSR during its 
entire existence, exactly 115 were shown over ten times on television 
during the past three years. Most of these were made during the 1930s; 
perhaps the collective daydreams of social integration, staged in the 
"grand style," continue to define the world of the Soviet and post-Soviet 
man to this day. 
The movie theatre, now transplanted to individual living rooms, remains a 
place of collective gathering and unification, a safe retreat for a society 
rocked to its core by the wave of reforms. Thus the peculiarities of 
Russian cinema, which was created largely by Russia's unique assimilation 
of modernity, have survived to this day, and the old "collective 
daydreams" remained as surrogates for a nonexistent national creative 
identity. The only difference is that the old mass-scale, solemn, non-
commercial cinema is now consumed not as ideology, but as 
entertainment; it has outlived the obsolete function to which Soviet 
cinema had clung for so many years. 
Perhaps it is this change in function that separates Russian cinema most 
distinctly from that of the rest of the world. The turn-of-the-century 
utopian imaginings, which presented the movie theatre as a place of social 
unification and the dissolution of class differences, was replaced in the 
'20s by a yet more radical vision; cinema became a laboratory for new 
modes of thought, perception, and movement, with the capacity to reach 
and transform millions. During Stalin's reign cinema was deliberately 
made into a means of conserving and translating the loftier, more 
traditional art forms, and a medium for the rewriting of history and 
historical memory. The national infatuation with post-individual values, 
established in the nineteenth century, remained crucial. This orientation 
was reflected in the various stylistic peculiarities of the period—the archaic 
treatment of poetics and the neutralization of expressive possibilities, both 
hallmarks of the 1930s. Even the Russian cinematic avant-garde, who 
created individually-authored film with its own singular poetics (and far 
surpassing the experiments of the Futurists and Surrealists), aimed not so 
much to express the individual "I" as to convey a total worldview, 
revealing the motives behind historical processes and mass-scale events 
which consumed the individual, with all of his personal thoughts and 
experiences, and enslaved him to a causality beyond his control. Only 
after the 20th Party Congress did Russian cinema attempt to delineate the 
individual's drama within the collective destiny, which immediately 
became evident in the new, subjective means of expression. Yet even this 
process of liberation was firmly tied to Russian tradition. To this day, not a 
single Russian film has successfully disentangled itself from the 
mesmerizing paradigm of the "unhappy ending," which has been 
disregarded only in the amalgamated cinema of pop culture. 
Russian cinema, which, like any other cinematic school, had to define 
itself within both the global and the local contexts, caught between 
making its language universal and remaining trapped inside the strongbox 
of national tradition or an author's individualism, offered up various 
combinations during the course of this century. This text has pointed out 
but a few of these. 
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